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Settling the Scienter Split:
Why Scienter Should Not Be Required for
SEC Enforcement of Rule 13b2-2 Violations
Robert Strongarone*
I. INTRODUCTION
“When misinformation causes loss, it is small comfort to the investor
to know that he has been bilked by negligent mistake rather than by
fraudulent design, particularly when recovery of his loss has been
foreclosed by this Court’s decisions.”1 Courts have been analyzing various
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules since the SEC was
established, to determine on a rule-by-rule basis, if scienter2 is an element
that the Commission must prove in order to prevail in civil enforcement
actions.3
In early 2008, executives of Thornburg Mortgage (Thornburg), a
publicly traded company, disseminated information to auditors to prepare
the company’s 2007 form 10-K.4 Thornburg had a tough year in 2007; the
weakening real estate market decreased the company’s investment values,
resulting in margin calls on its investment loans.5 Despite this, the
executives prepared a letter to Thornburg’s outside auditor overstating the
financial condition of the company.6 Based on this information, the
auditors agreed that the losses were temporary and did not need to be
disclosed to shareholders.7 Over the course of the year, asset values
*
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editors for their valuable input and support. Any errors are mine alone.
1
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 716 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In a suit brought by the
SEC for injunctive relief for a violation of Rule 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3), the Court held that the SEC was
required to establish scienter. Justice Blackmun dissented based on statutory interpretation and
congressional intent.
2
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (9th ed. 2009) (defining scienter as “a degree of knowledge
that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an
act’s having been done knowingly, especially as a ground for civil damages or criminal punishment”).
3 See generally SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 188 (1976); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
4
SEC v. Goldstone, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1077 (2013).
5
See generally Patrick Fitzgerald, Judge Says SEC Can Proceed with Thornburg Mortgage
Fraud Suit, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2013, 2:03 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323368704578595811853715032.
6
Goldstone, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
7
Id. at 1093.

318

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 10:317

continued falling, and in May of 2009, Thornburg filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection, resulting in a total loss for investors holding
common shares.8
The SEC brought multiple claims against the executives, including one
under SEC Rule 13b2-2.9 The Commission alleged that the executives: (1)
failed to disclose that the company was struggling to meet margin calls; (2)
took temporary measures to ward off margin calls; and (3) would be forced
to sell investments at a loss due to the impending hedge fund collapse.10
The executives mounted a defense based on a lack of scienter.11 They
argued that the SEC failed to prove that they disregarded obvious “risks of
misleading investors,” failed to allege facts demonstrating the executives
“believed the statements in the 10-K were false or misleading at the time
they were made,” and failed to prove that they “prepared the 10-K with any
intent to defraud investors.”12 Interoffice e-mails document the executives’
awareness that the information provided to the accountants was
misleading.13
This kind of communication by Thornburg’s executives is problematic
under SEC regulations. SEC Rule 13b2-2 was enacted to prevent the
communication of misinformation to accountants in connection with audits
or SEC filings.14 By signing the letter to the auditors, the executives
functionally ratified the information contained in the letter. Whether or not
the SEC could prove an intent to mislead the accountants, the executives
became responsible when they signed the letter. By eliminating negligence
as a defense for violations of Rule 13b2-2, executives are forced to make
themselves aware of the content they are certifying and to ensure that it is
correct. This is important to protect investors and to hold executives
accountable for both negligent and intentionally fraudulent actions.
Rule 13b2-2 provides that “no director or officer shall, directly or
indirectly . . . [m]ake or cause to be made a materially false or misleading
statement to an accountant . . . .”15 The Rule extends to information
provided to accountants and auditors who produce the filings which public
companies are required to file with the SEC.16 Investors directly and

8

Id.
Id. at 1088.
10
Id. at 1091-92.
11
Id. at 1103.
12
Id. at 1094.
13
Id. at 1086.
14
See generally Representations and Conduct in Connection with the Preparation of Required
Reports and Documents, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2015).
15
17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(a) (2015).
16
17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b)(1) (2015).
9
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indirectly rely on the integrity of the data contained in these filings when
purchasing securities.17 Direct reliance occurs when investors review
company financial reports and releases to make investment decisions.18
Indirect reliance is assumed based on the efficient capital market theory.19
The federal circuit courts of appeals are currently split on the issue of
whether the SEC should be required to prove scienter in Rule 13b2-2 civil
enforcement actions.20 This article will demonstrate that, because the SEC
and the investing public rely on the data provided to accountants and
auditors, the SEC should not be required to prove the element of scienter
when enforcing Rule 13b2-2 in civil actions. Holding directors and officers
to a negligence standard will discourage carelessness and ensure that
accountants receive accurate information, which is in the best interests of
the investing public.21
To set the stage, Section I(A) will begin by explaining why the SEC
was created. An analysis of the legislative intent behind the enabling
statute for Rule 13b2-2, and a discussion of the SEC’s purpose for drafting
Rule 13b2-2 follow. The legislature and the SEC’s intent are essential to
the argument against a scienter requirement. The article continues with an
in-depth discussion of the Ninth and Second Circuit cases representing the
two leading interpretations of Rule 13b2-2 with respect to scienter in
Sections II and III respectively. Section IV examines recent laws passed by
Congress to show that the concerns that originally gave rise to Rule 13b2-2
still exist. Section IV also highlights recent legislation in light of the
economic crises this country has experienced and the legislation created in
its wake. Deference to agency interpretations, including the Chevron and
Skidmore doctrines, provide context for the legal basis concerning
deference to the SEC interpretation of its own rules. Finally, the Section V
summarizes the analysis, concluding that the SEC should not be required to
prove scienter when enforcing Rule 13b2-2.
A. Creation of the SEC
Beginning in the late 1920s and lasting approximately ten years, the
Great Depression was a severe economic downturn causing rampant
17

Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 989 (1988) (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154,
1160-61 (3d. Cir. 1986)).
18
See id. at 980.
19
Id. at 991 n.24 (explaining that the efficient capital market theory means that “market
professionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby
affecting stock market prices”).
20
See SEC v. Goldstone, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1212 (2013) (discussing the split between the
Second and Ninth Circuits).
21
See Byron F. Egan, Major Themes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 42 TEX. J. BUS. L. 333, 430-33
(2008).
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unemployment and stock market declines.22 While the reasons for the
depression are debated, varied, and mostly beyond the scope of this article,
manipulation of the securities markets was a contributing factor.23 In the
wake of the Great Depression, securities and banking legislation was
enacted to increase transparency and prevent the scenarios that contributed
to the economic decline from recurring.24 The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was passed during this period and was the legislation that created the
SEC.25
The SEC is an independent administrative agency26 of the Executive
Branch of the United States Government.27 The Commission’s original
purpose was to restore investor confidence by ensuring that the companies,
brokers, and exchanges disseminated honest information, putting investors’
interests before their own.28 The current mission statement of the
Commission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”29 The SEC uses a number of key
functions to carry out its mission.30 The Commission interprets existing
federal securities laws and creates new rules to further its goals.31 The
Commission provides oversight of broker-dealers, ratings agencies, and
self-regulatory organizations (“SRO”) and enforces securities laws and
rules.32
B. SEC Rulemaking
The SEC creates rules within the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) guidelines.33 Rules are usually created at the direction of an
enabling act34 or one of the rulemaking divisions within the Commission:

22
Joy Sabino Mullane, Perfect Storms: Congressional Regulation of Executive Compensation,
57 VILL. L. REV. 589, 594 (2012).
23
Norman S. Poser, Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate Control Transactions, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 671, 690 (1986).
24
Mullane, supra note 22, at 600-01.
25
Id. at 601.
26
Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative Agency
Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 969 (1991).
27
See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml [hereinafter U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N].
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
See id.
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
See Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1311 (2009).
34
See id. at 1312.
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the Market Regulation, Corporate Finance, or Investment Management
divisions.35 As in other administrative contexts, the rulemaking process
consists of three general steps.36 First, the Commission may begin with a
concept release, outlining a problem that needs to be solved and seeking
proposed solutions from the public to remedy the problem.37 Next, the
APA requires the Commission to publish a proposed rule in the Federal
Register.38 Interested parties are given an opportunity to voice support for
or concerns about the proposed rule and to participate in the rulemaking
process.39 The final rule, including any changes proposed and accepted
during the notice and comment period, is then published in the Federal
Register.40
C. SEC Investigation and Enforcement
Many types of conduct can trigger an SEC investigation of potential
SEC rule violations.41 The SEC engages in market surveillance, receives
tips and complaints from investors, and coordinates with other
governmental entities to uncover possible rule violations and initiate
investigations.42 A thorough investigation is conducted using methods such
as reviewing financial records and interviewing associated parties.43 After a
case is developed, it is presented to the Commissioners to decide what, if
any, remedy should be sought.44
The SEC may pursue various remedies to thwart ongoing violations of
law or seek justice for violations that have occurred.45 The SEC is limited
to civil enforcement of the federal securities laws.46 A panoply of remedial
mechanisms exist: a cease and desist order to stop ongoing activities, an
injunction to prevent future violations, monetary penalties (fines) to punish
and discourage future violations, and disgorgement to prevent unjust
enrichment from ill-gotten gains.47 Criminal enforcement may be sought

35
David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation Needs After the SEC
Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 52 (2005).
36
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 27.
37
See id.
38
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2015).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 27.
42
Id.
43
See id.
44
See id.
45
Griffin Finan et al., Securities Fraud, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1129, 1183 (2011).
46
Id. at 1183.
47
Rebecca Gross et al., Securities Fraud, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1213, 1266-72 (2012)
(discussing remedies that the SEC can seek).

322

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 10:317

only through another agency like the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), with
or without SEC involvement.48
D. The History of Rule 13b2-2
The focus here is on a specific SEC Rule: 13b2-2. Concern for the
accuracy of financial statements was addressed in section 11 of the original
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.49 Section 11 allowed for investors to sue
directors and officers for rescission or damages for losses resulting from
material misinformation or omissions.50 Showing a reasonable belief in the
information when it was communicated allows directors and officers to
avoid liability.51 The same is true today.52
In the 1970s, a Watergate Special Prosecutor’s investigation uncovered
hundreds of illegal bribes by domestic corporations to foreign political
officials.53 The SEC suggested a new set of rules to supplement the 1934
Act to, among other things, “prohibit the making of false, misleading or
incomplete statements to an accountant in connections with any
examination or audit” used to cover up such bribes.54 As a result, Congress
adopted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, and created section
13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act.
Born from this new legislation, Rule 13b2-2 was intended to
“encourage careful and accurate communications between auditors and
issuers from whom they request information during the audit process, deter
the making of false, misleading or incomplete statements to accountants,
and thereby enhance the integrity of the financial disclosure system.”55
During the notice and comment period for the original Rule, commenters
expressed concern for the lack of a scienter requirement.56
The
Commission responded that a scienter requirement would be inconsistent
with section 13(b)(2), which indicated no congressional intent to impose a
scienter requirement.57
The enabling statute for the modern Rule 13b2-2 is section 303(a) of

48

Id. at 1275.
John Hanna, The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (1934).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Promotion of the Reliability of Financial Information and Prevention of the Concealment of
Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, 16 SEC
Docket 1143 (Feb. 15, 1979).
54
Id. at 3.
55
Id. at 10.
56
Id. at 12.
57
Id. at 10.
49
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).58 It was created in the
wake of the stock market decline and accounting scandals which marked
the first two years of the new millennium.59 A number of well-known
publicly traded companies filed for bankruptcy protection during this
period, including Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia
Communications, and Tyco International.60 These corporations perpetrated
accounting fraud in cooperation with large accounting firms, costing
investors billions of dollars and eroding the public confidence in the
securities markets.61 Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley in response to the
accounting fraud, market decline, and drop in investor confidence to
prevent a repeat of history.62
In furtherance of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC initiated rulemaking to
create Rule 13b2-2, intended to replace Rule 13B-2.63 Rule 13b2-2 was
proposed on October 18, 2002.64 After a notice and comment period, the
Rule was enacted on June 26, 2003.65 The new Rule is composed of three
sections.
1. Rule 13b2-2(a)
Section (a) prohibits directors or officers of an issuer from directly or
indirectly making material false statements or omissions to accountants in
connection with audits or financial statements intended for audit purposes
or for SEC filings.66
2. Rule 13b2-2(b)
Section (b) prohibits directors, officers, or persons acting on their
behalf to “coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence”
accountants if they “knew or should have known” that it would result in
misleading financial statements.67 This includes issuing reports that do not

58

17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2015).
Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2004).
60
Id.; see also Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1544-45 (2005) (listing the companies that went bankrupt during this
time period).
61
Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: Balancing the
Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 638 (2007).
62
Id.
63
Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,820-01, 31,820 (Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n May 29, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter Improper Influence].
64
See id at 31,859 n.4.
65
See id at 31,820.
66
17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(a) (2015).
67
17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b)(1) (2015) (emphasis added).
59
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conform to generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), failing to
report in violation of GAAP, and failing to disclose or withdraw a report
after it has been deemed misleading.
3. Rule 13b2-2(c)
Section (c) of the Rule applies the same standards applied in sections
(a) and (b) to investment companies registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940.68
E. What is Scienter?
The Supreme Court has defined scienter as “intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.”69 Black’s Law Dictionary defines scienter as “a
degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission.”70 Recklessness can also
constitute scienter.71 The conduct of a corporate officer is reckless when
that officer is acting with an “extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care” and in a way that can cause misleading information to reach
the investing public, if the danger that misleading information can reach the
investing public is known or when the danger is so clear that it should have
been known.72
Proving scienter requires a demonstration of the defendant’s state of
mind.73 For the SEC to prevail in an enforcement action which contains a
scienter element, the Commission must show that the defendant knew or
should have known that their act or omission was fraudulent.74 Scienter is
typically the most difficult element of a crime to prove because of the
difficulty in proving a state of mind.75
Complexities in proving scienter make it the element defendants
frequently use as a basis for dismissal of charges.76 Complications arise
when a representative, genuinely ignorant of the falsity of the information
provided to them, disseminates the false information.77 The theory of

68

17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(c) (2015).
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
70
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
71
SEC v. Dain Rauscher Inc., 254 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001).
72
Id. at 856.
73
Ryan G. Meist, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1998).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Browning Jeffries, The Implications of Janus on Issuer Liability in Jurisdictions Rejecting
Collective Scienter, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 491, 494 (2013).
77
Id.
69
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collective scienter attempts to remedy this situation.78 Collective scienter
attributes the requisite scienter to the organization as a whole when the
individuals perpetrating the underlying fraud cannot be identified.79 Many
jurisdictions reject collective scienter and continue to require the scienter of
the individual asserting the fraudulent information to be proven.80
A comparison of scienter with conceptions of mens rea relevant to
criminal cases illuminates distinctions and the ultimate problems associated
with the incorporation of a scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2.
Historically, the state of mind of the accused has been an important element
in the United States’ system of justice.81 Lawmakers have often included
the words “willful” and “malicious” in criminal statutes to establish intent,
or mens rea82 required for a conviction.83 Mens rea has a broader scope of
culpability than scienter.84 Negligence is the broadest tier of mens rea,
creating culpability when the actor “should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk.”85 Recklessness builds on negligence by specifying a
heightened requirement of “conscious disregard” of the substantial and
unjustifiable risk.86 Knowledge creates further culpability because the actor
is “aware that it is practically certain that [the] conduct will cause a certain
result.”87 The most culpable level of mens rea is purpose—consciously
engaging in some conduct with the intention of causing the result.88
Mens rea is a legal element of crime intended to protect the public
from undeserved punishment.89 Scienter is analogous to mens rea and is
typically required in civil cases.90 Unlike mens rea, scienter does not
include culpability for negligence.91 Knowledge requirements have their
roots in the common law.92 Courts relied on the level of a defendant’s

78

Id. at 494-95.
Id. at 495.
80
Id.
81
Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related Offenses,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (2006).
82
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1006 (defining mens rea as: [Law Latin “guilty
mind”] (1861) “The state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a
defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness”).
83
Seigel, supra note 81, at 1564.
84
Id. at 1571.
85
Id. at 1572 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985)).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 1569.
90
Id. at 1604.
91
SEC v. Dain Rauscher Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 2001).
92
Jeanne P. Bolger, Recklessness and the Rule 10b-5 Scienter Standard After Hochfelder, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 817, 822 (1981).
79
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knowledge and intent to determine culpability and the severity of the
sentence, if any.93 Accordingly, one who causes the death of another may
have committed murder, but, because of a lack of intent, may be acquitted.94
Similarly, for securities fraud charges requiring proof of scienter, the
accused can escape liability by showing a lack of scienter.95
Of course, criminal charges of any kind can be brought by
governmental entities only; individuals cannot bring criminal charges.96
Violation of criminal laws generally results in the loss of life, liberty,
property, or a combination thereof.97 Civil suits can be brought by
governments or by individuals.98 Civil remedies can be loss of property in
the form of fines or injunctive relief, but not imprisonment.99 Civil laws
can be broken down further into two classes: those that include a private
cause of action and those that can be enforced only by the government.100
Civil laws that include a private cause of action may include elements to
protect individuals from frivolous lawsuits designed to compel a
settlement.101 Civil laws lacking a private cause of action exist to allow the
government to protect the public and enforce laws; such laws may have
lower pleading requirements and fewer elements to prove.102
F. A Point of Confusion
While seemingly similar, there is an important distinction to be made
between fraud charges relating to GAAP non-compliance and charges
brought for a violation of Rule 13b2-2. Generally, scienter is an element
that must be proven to prevail on fraud charges in relation to GAAP noncompliance.103
Simply publishing inaccurate information may not

93

Id. at 822-23.
See, e.g., Regina v. Cunningham, 41 Crim. App. 155 (1957).
95
See generally SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d
912 (9th Cir. 2010).
96
John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1037-38 (2009)
(contrasting criminal and civil suits); see also Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85 (1981) (affirming
lower court holding that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
non-prosecution of another”).
97
See also Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231 (discussing
death penalty); see generally Leeke, 454 U.S. at 85.
98
Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law,
101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1814 (1992).
99
Id. at 1812.
100
Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied
Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 861 (1996).
101
Mann, supra note 98, at 1814.
102
Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5: Empirical
Analysis and Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 441, 448 (2012).
103
SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2011).
94
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necessarily prove scienter, but significant violations may indicate
scienter.104 An important distinction to make is that Rule 13b2-2 is not a
rule about accounting and proper accounting methods.105 Instead the Rule
forbids making false statements or material omissions with respect to the
company’s financials to accountants preparing reports for the SEC or for
audit purposes.106 Therefore to analogize Rule 13b2-2 to the scienter
requirement for GAAP violations is improper. This Rule is about
communication and withholding information, not the methods used by the
accountants to arrive at their reported results.
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASE HISTORY
Current precedent in the Ninth Circuit requires the SEC to prove
scienter to prevail on a Rule 13b2-2 action.107 The most recent case from
the Ninth Circuit is SEC v. Todd, which relied heavily on United States v.
Goyal.108
A. United States v. Goyal
Goyal, decided in 2010, was a criminal case brought by the United
States Attorney’s Office in the Northern District of California against
Prabhat Goyal, the CFO of NAI, a security software firm.109 Goyal was
charged with, among other things, violations of Rule 13b2-2.110 The
government contended that Goyal made materially false statements to
PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”), the outside auditors to NAI.111
In 1998, NAI expanded from a direct sales distribution method by
entering into sales agreements with distribution companies.112 The
government took issue with NAI’s recording of revenue from these sales
agreements, asserting that NAI prematurely recognized the revenues to be
received and causing revenue to be overstated on the company’s financial
reports.113 Specifically, Goyal was accused of misleading PwC in letters he
signed attesting that NAI’s accounting conformed with GAAP and that NAI

104
Id. (citing Dannenberg v. Painewebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc.), 50 F.3d 615,
627 (1994)).
105
See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2015).
106
See generally id.
107
Todd, 642 F.3d at 1225.
108
See id. at 1219.
109
See generally United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2010).
110
Id. at 914.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 913.
113
Id. at 914.
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disclosed all sales terms.114
A jury convicted Goyal on seven counts of making materially false
statements to PwC.115 Upon the district court’s denial of Goyal’s motion for
judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, Goyal brought an appeal before
the Ninth Circuit.116 The court, interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 78, held that the
government was required to prove scienter, that is, show Goyal knew his
statements were false, for him to be criminally liable.117 Analyzing Rule
13b2-2, the court noted “[c]riminal liability under Rule 13b2-2 therefore
also requires that a false statement to an auditor be made knowingly.”118
The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that
the government had failed to prove that Goyal knowingly deceived NAI’s
auditors, and therefore, as a matter of law, a jury could not have found him
guilty.119
B. SEC v. Todd
In 2011, the Ninth Circuit decided SEC v. Todd.120 In Todd, the SEC
sued Todd, Weitzen, and Manza, the CFO, CEO, and controller,
respectively, of Gateway, a computer manufacturer and retailer.121 As
controller, Manza was responsible for preparing Gateway’s financial
statements.122 Todd’s responsibilities included reviewing and signing the
company’s financial reports.123 Weitzen and Todd participated in a
conference call touting “accelerating revenue growth,” and Weitzen
prepared a press release stating the company had experienced “accelerated
year-over-year revenue growth.”124 Amid a weakening demand for
personal computers and record revenue reports by the company, the SEC
investigated Gateway’s claims.125
During fiscal year 2000, a number of transactions were recorded
improperly, artificially inflating revenue.126 Gateway sold fixed assets to
another company, Lockheed, which then leased the assets back to

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id. at 916.
Id. at 914.
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Id. at 916.
Id. at 922 n.6 (emphasis added).
Id. at 922-23.
See generally SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1213.
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Id. at 1213-14.
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Gateway.127 Nevertheless, Gateway recorded the asset sale as revenue, a
violation of GAAP.128 Gateway had a sales agreement with VenServ that
required a minimum number of referrals before Gateway would receive
payment.129 Gateway had not yet met the threshold, and accordingly had
not yet been paid, but still reported the anticipated revenue.130 An
agreement with America Online (“AOL”) was modified, changing the
timing of payments to Gateway, resulting in a $72 million revenue boost.131
The officers failed to disclose that this was not sustainable revenue growth,
but instead a one-time transaction.132
The SEC brought a suit against Todd and Manza alleging, among other
things, a violation of Rule 13b2-2 for preparing and delivering false
financial statements to PwC, Gateway’s outside accountant and auditor.133
Weitzen’s alleged violation of Rule 13b2-2 stemmed from his signing the
statements delivered to PwC.134
On the Rule 13b2-2 claim, the district court granted summary
judgment for Weitzen.135 A jury found Todd and Manza liable for violating
Rule 13b2-2, but the district court granted motions as a matter of law to set
aside the jury verdict.136 The SEC appealed the district court decisions.137
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, relying on United States v. Goyal,
asserted that scienter was an element of Rule 13b2-2138 and affirmed
summary judgment in favor of Weitzen.139 The court held that the SEC
failed to prove scienter because it had not shown Weitzen had knowledge of
the improperly booked transactions.140 Similarly, Todd and Manza’s
judgments were affirmed because, based on the facts presented by the SEC,
they did not know the letter to PwC was a false representation of the
company’s financials; they therefore lacked scienter.141 Vital to the analysis
of these two cases is that the court failed to distinguish between the criminal
liability that Goyal was facing and the civil liability of Todd, Manza, and
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Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1214.
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Weitzen.
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CASE HISTORY
The Second Circuit is home to Wall Street—the financial hub of the
Americas, if not the world.142 Accordingly, many securities-related cases
arise in the Second Circuit.143
A. SEC v. McNulty
In 1998, the Second Circuit decided SEC v. McNulty.144 McNulty
controlled two auto parts businesses, which raised a combined total of
seventy-eight million dollars from investors between 1988 and 1990.145
Portions of the funds raised by McNulty were diverted to other entities
controlled by McNulty.146 This information was not communicated to
investors.147 John Shanklin, a co-defendant, was an officer and director of
both auto parts businesses, and was responsible for both companies’
accounting and SEC filings.148
The SEC alleged that Shanklin misrepresented or concealed the
diverting of funds away from their intended purpose.149 Further, they
asserted that Shanklin knew or was reckless in failing to know about the
misrepresentations.150 After failing to file an answer to the allegations, the
court entered a default judgment against Shanklin and McNulty.151
Shanklin hired new counsel, and moved to vacate the default judgment
against him.152 He argued that, among other things, the SEC did not prove
all elements of the claim because it failed to prove that he acted with
scienter.153 Although Shanklin admitted to signing false and incomplete
disclosure forms for the SEC, he denied involvement in raising funds or
knowledge of any misstatements in corporate filings.154 The court held that
section 13 of the 1934 Act and the SEC rules established thereunder “are
142
Shaun Mulreed, Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How Scienter Has Prevented
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 from Achieving Its Goals, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
779, 807 (2005).
143
Id. at 807.
144
SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (2d. Cir. 1998).
145
Id. at 734.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 735.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
See id.
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provisions under which civil liability may be imposed without proof of
scienter.”155 The court quoted its original opinion, describing Shanklin as a
“sophisticated businessman,” agreeing that he should be “responsible for
the accuracy of the information” in the filings he signed.156 The court held
that Shanklin could not escape liability for misinformation contained in
filings that he signed by blaming the preparer for their content.157 In this
regard, the court held Shanklin to a strict liability standard; he signed the
filings and was therefore responsible for their content.158
B. SEC v. Espuelas
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
heard SEC v. Espuelas in 2010.159 In Espuelas, the defendants were officers
and directors of StarMedia, an Internet portal targeting Spanish and
Portuguese markets.160 The SEC’s allegations revolved around the revenue
reported by StarMedia.161
The company was engaged in “barter
transactions.”162 StarMedia sold advertising to generate revenue.163 Under
a reciprocal agreement, StarMedia would then purchase an equal dollar
amount of advertising, resulting in a net zero revenue effect.164 StarMedia
failed to report these transactions as barter transactions, instead booking
them as independent transactions.165 The result was overstated revenue.166
The company also engaged in contingent transactions, which artificially
boosted revenue.167 In these transactions, the company would present
proposed advertising services to a client.168 If the client accepted the
proposal, the company would receive a larger sum than if the proposal was
rejected.169 The company would include the full revenue before the

155

Id. at 736.
Id. at 736 (quoting SEC v. McNulty, No. 94-CIV-7114(MBM), 1996 WL 422259, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1996)).
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Id.
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BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1644 (defining a wrong of strict liability as “a
wrong in which a mens rea is not required because neither wrongful intent not culpable negligence is a
necessary condition of responsibility”).
159
See generally SEC v. Espuelas, 698 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
160
Id. at 418.
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Id. at 419.
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proposal was accepted, fraudulently inflating revenue.170
StarMedia’s officers and directors signed letters to their independent
auditing firm Ernst & Young attesting that their “receivables represent valid
claims . . . and do not include amounts for . . . other types of arrangements
not constituting sales.”171 They also claimed to have included all sales
agreements and asserted that no fraud was perpetrated by employees of the
company, yet none of the reciprocal agreements or contingent agreements
were communicated to the outside auditors.172
The SEC brought charges against StarMedia officers for violating a
multitude of Exchange Act rules, including SEC Rule 13b2-2 and other
rules under section 13 of the Exchange Act.173 The officers moved to
dismiss the charges against them, but the court denied the motions.174 The
court stated there was no question materially misleading statements were
made in letters to the independent auditor.175 Accordingly, the court relied
on SEC v. McNulty, holding that Rule 13b2-2 does not require the SEC to
plead and prove scienter.176
IV. ANALYSIS: SUPPORTING THE SECOND CIRCUIT VIEW
Rule 13b2-2 is an important tool for the SEC to carry out their mission
of protecting investors; maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets; and
facilitating capital formation.177 Aside from the legal reasons, there are
valid policy reasons supporting the Second Circuit’s holding that the SEC
need not prove scienter to prevail in civil actions to enforce Rule 13b2-2.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Error
When deciding SEC v. Todd, the Ninth Circuit used a criminal case
holding to decide a civil case, failing to distinguish between the two.178
This blurs the important fundamental distinctions between civil and
criminal penalties and undermines the unique purposes of criminal and civil
laws. A guilty verdict in criminal cases can result in imprisonment, fines,

170

Id.
Id. at 423 (quoting Amended Complaint at 116, SEC v. Espuelas, 698 F. Supp. 2d 415
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)) (discussing the misrepresentations made to Ernst & Young in the letters from the
officers).
172
Id.
173
Id. at 434.
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Id. at 436.
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Id.
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Id. at 436 (citing SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (2d. Cir. 1998)).
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See Improper Influence, supra note 63.
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SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d
912 (9th Cir. 2010), a criminal case, in support of a knowingly standard to be used in Todd, a civil case).
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probation, restitution, or death.179 Therefore, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is required to convict on a criminal charge given the enhanced
severity of possible penalties.180 Civil remedies, on the other hand, result in
less onerous punishments, such as monetary awards or some form of
injunctive relief.181 As such, the burden of proof is a preponderance of the
evidence, a lower standard.182 Courts cannot apply the same burden of
proof standards to civil and criminal cases.183
To be punished criminally, one must act with some degree of scienter
or mens rea.184 If scienter is a required element for civil liability, it may be
necessary to specifically identify it as such.185 The Ninth Circuit analogized
Goyal, a criminal case, to Todd, a civil case, to determine that scienter is
required for liability under Rule 13b2-2.186 Scienter is not an express
element of Rule 13b2-2.187 Because Todd was a civil case brought by the
SEC for violation of a rule which does not require scienter, the Ninth
Circuit erroneously relied on Goyal by holding that scienter was required
for the respondents to be held civilly liable for their actions.
The Ninth Circuit instead should have looked to cases such as
McNulty, which were analogous but not binding, to hold that a civil action
brought by the SEC under a rule that does not require scienter should not be
held to a higher requirement—requiring scienter.
B. Legislative Intent: Sarbanes-Oxley
In 2002, Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley to prevent a repeat of the
accounting frauds that led to large corporate bankruptcies, market declines,
and investor losses.188 The Act required the SEC to create or amend rules to

179
Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment’s Right to
Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 32 (2005).
180
Elizabeth A. Ryan, The 13th Juror: Re-Evaluating the Need for a Factual Sufficiency Review
in Criminal Cases, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1291, 1299 (2005).
181
Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal Liability: Qui Tam Actions,
Corporate Integrity Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 625,
626 (2007).
182
Ryan, supra note 180, at 1299; see also Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and
Criminal Punishment: Presumption of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1203, 1205 (explaining that criminal prosecution is worse than civil sanction and therefore triggers
distinct rights and duties).
183
Ryan, supra note 180, at 1299.
184
Siegel, supra note 81, at 1569.
185
See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957).
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SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1219, 1219 (9th Cir. 2011).
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17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2015).
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Johnson & Sides, supra note 59, at 1153; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, §§ 301-08, 116 Stat. 745, 775-85 (2002).
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regulate corporate responsibility for accurate financial reporting.189 Most
relevant to this analysis are sections 302 and 303 of Title III, titled
“Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports.”190
Section 302 was an expression of Congress’s intention to hold
corporate officers responsible for the accuracy of the information they
disseminate.191 The section requires the SEC to create rules creating
corporate officer accountability.192
Specifically, officers are held
responsible for their organization’s internal controls,193 must disclose
deficiencies and fraud to auditors,194 and disclose changes in internal
controls.195 Furthermore, officers who sign quarterly and annual financial
reports must review the reports196 to ensure the reports do not contain
material misstatements or omissions,197 and fairly represent the company
condition.198
By enacting section 303, Congress verbalized its intention to protect
the public interest and the interests of investors.199 Section 303 declares
unlawful any action that will mislead auditors for the purpose of causing the
auditors’ financial reports to be materially misleading.200 The SEC is
granted exclusive jurisdiction to enforce, in civil proceedings, any rule or
regulation issued under this section.201 There is no mention of “knowing”
violations or “scienter” in the enabling statute.202 Accordingly, a scienter
element should not be added to Rule 13b2-2 based on legislative intent
because it was promulgated under section 303. A court ruling that requires
the SEC to prove scienter is tantamount to the court rewriting the enabling
statute.
C. Subsequent SEC Rulemaking
Based on section 303(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC proposed an
amendment of then-existing Rule 13b2-2 to conform to the new law.203 In
189
190
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195
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199
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See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101.
Id. at § 302.
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Id. at § 302(a).
Id. at § 302(a)4.
Id. at § 302(a)5.
Id. at § 302(a)6.
Id. at § 302(a)(1).
Id. at § 302(a)2.
Id. at § 302(a)3.
Id. at § 303(a).
Id.
Id. at § 303(b).
See generally id. at §§ 302-03.
Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,325, 65,325 (Oct. 24, 2002) (to be
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October of 2002 the proposed Rule was published in the Federal Register
for notice and comment.204
Specifically, the Commission solicited
comments on the wording of the Rule addressing certain actions “to coerce,
manipulate, mislead or fraudulently influence” auditors.205 The SEC
included this language to address these actions, creating civil liability for
them regardless of the effect on audit results.206 The Commission explicitly
stated in the Rule proposal that the word “fraudulently” modified the word
“influence” exclusively, and did not apply to the coercion, manipulation, or
misleading elements of the Rule.207
The SEC received comments suggesting that “fraudulently” should
modify all of the actions, not only the influence aspect of the Rule.208
Others suggested a materiality aspect to the misleading element, or that
“any attempt to purposely skew the issuer’s disclosure should violate the
[R]ule.”209 Ernst & Young, one of the “Big Four” international accounting
firms,210 suggested that fraudulent intent should not be required for officers
or directors, but should be required for third parties.211 The SEC ultimately
decided that the “fraudulently” modifier would apply only to the verb
“influence.”212 To clarify the Rule, “fraudulently influence” was placed at
the end of the sentence to ensure that only “influence” was subject to the
“fraudulently” modifier.213
Addressing the other comments, the Commission specified that Rule
13b2-2 historically prohibited making, or causing to be made, materially
misleading statements to auditors, and the new Rule would not modify the
existing standard.214 The SEC reiterated that the purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley
is to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, and decided that
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
204
Id.
205
Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,820, 31,820 (May 28, 2003) (to
be codified at C.F.R. pt. 240) (emphasis added).
206
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207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
The term “big four” originates from the term “big eight,” which was coined in the 1960s to
describe the top eight largest international accounting firms. Throughout the years, the firms
consolidated to five top firms. After the Enron scandal, Arthur Andersen ceased operations leaving the
remaining “big four” as they are known today. See JAMES BROCK, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRY 332 (12th ed.) (citing S.A. ZEFF, HOW THE US ACCOUNTING PROFESSION GOT WHERE IT IS
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(audit firms), WIKIPEDIA.COM, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Four_auditors (last visited Mar. 19,
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“imposing what would amount to a new scienter requirement on the
preexisting provision prohibiting officers and directors from causing
misleading statements or omissions to be made to auditors” would be
contrary to the intent of the Act.215
D. Deference to SEC Interpretation
There are two deference standards that courts may apply to determine
whether to defer to an agency interpretation: Skidmore deference and
Chevron deference.216 Chevron deference is more frequently cited by the
Supreme Court, and is a very deferential standard.217 Chevron is often used
when agencies use formal rulemaking, or rulemaking utilizing notice and
comment rulemaking—as the SEC did with the promulgation of 13b2-2.218
Skidmore is used less often, and is less deferential.219 Skidmore is more
frequently used for interpretive rules, which do not utilize notice and
comment periods.220 Under both doctrines, courts generally will defer to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of the authority granted to it.221 In
the interest of thorough analysis, a brief Skidmore discussion will be
followed by a deeper Chevron analysis.
1. Skidmore Deference
Skidmore v. Swift was a Supreme Court case to determine whether to
defer to an interpretive bulletin issued by the Administrator of Labor.222
The employees verbally agreed to sleep on premises, and receive overtime
pay only when answering alarms.223 The employees then sued their
employer for overtime pay for all their time spent on call, including when
they were sleeping on premises.224 Lower courts dismissed the workers’
suit.225 The Administrator of Labor bulletin suggested a flexible solution to
consider the freedom of the employee to engage in personal activities,
rather than an “all-in” or “all-out” approach to “on call” pay.226 Deferring
to the agency, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, allowing the
215
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case to be heard to determine if the employers should determine if, and how
much, employees should be compensated for this time where they may not
be working, but are still limited in where they can go or what they can
do.227 The Court acknowledged that the agency interpretations are not
binding on the Court, but that interpretations do “constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.”228
It logically follows, therefore, that a court would likely defer to the
SEC interpretation of the laws and rules based on its vast experience in
securities law. Skidmore deference, applied to SEC’s interpretation of Rule
13b2-2, would likely relieve the SEC from the need to prove scienter to
prevail in a civil enforcement case.
2. Chevron Deference
Courts would more likely apply the Chevron doctrine when analyzing
deference standards, because Rule 13b2-2 was subject to notice and
comment, and was not merely an interpretive rule.229 So long as the
enabling statute was ambiguous, and the agency interpretation is
reasonable, Chevron deference will apply.230 Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council is a Supreme Court case establishing a two-part test.231
The first part of the test is to determine if Congress’ intent was clear, or if
the statute is ambiguous.232 If the statute is found to be ambiguous, the
court will move to the second part of the analysis, deciding if the agency
interpretation was permissible based on the statute as written.233
The Chevron case involved the Clean Air Act passed by Congress,
which required polluters to obtain a permit before constructing any new or
modified “stationary sources” of pollution.234 In interpreting the statute, the
EPA promulgated a rule creating a “bubble policy” regarding the stationary
sources,235 grouping together pollution emitting devices within a facility.236
As a result, modifications to equipment occurring within a “bubble” would
not require the permit under the EPA regulation.237
227
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The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) is one of several
environmental-action groups who sought judicial review of the EPA
regulation of permit requirements for modifications, or new construction,
within an existing “bubble.”238 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia set aside the regulation, holding that the EPA “bubble
policy” did not appropriately define a polluting facility.239
The Supreme Court overturned the appellate court decision.240 First,
the Court analyzed the enabling statute, the Clean Air Act, finding that the
Act “does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a ‘stationary
source’ to which the permit program . . . should apply.”241 Nor could intent
be ascertained in the legislative history.242 Finding the meaning of a
stationary source to be ambiguous in the statute, the Court moved to the
second part of the test, holding that the agency interpretation “represented a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and was
entitled to deference.”243 Chevron is the primary basis for judicial
deference to agency interpretations when statutes are ambiguous, and the
agency interpretation is reasonable.244
E. Rule 13b2-2 Deference Analysis Under Chevron: The Ambiguity
Element
The first part of the analysis under Chevron is to determine if the
enabling statute is ambiguous as to a scienter requirement.245 The enabling
statute, Sarbanes-Oxley § 303, is divided into four parts. Part (a) is the
substantive law that will be analyzed for ambiguity.246 Parts (b), (c), and
(d) discuss enforcement authority, preemption of other laws, and deadlines
for SEC rulemaking respectively.247
Section 303(a) charges the SEC with creating rules as it deems
“necessary and appropriate” to protect the public and investors from
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misinformation provided to auditors by directors and officers of
companies.248 Specifically, the statute forbids officers or directors, or
anyone acting at their behest, from taking “any action to fraudulently
influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead” accounting professionals or
auditors “for the purpose of rendering such financial statements materially
misleading.”249
Ambiguity arises in the statute when determining whether
misinformation must be given intentionally, or whether negligence is
enough for a violation to occur. Notably, the statute “contains no words
indicating that Congress intended to impose a ‘scienter’ requirement,” such
as knowingly or willfully.250 Criminal liability for rule violation expressly
carries a “knowingly” requirement.251 However, the SEC may only bring
civil enforcement cases against defendants.252 Because the statute expressly
mentions criminal enforcement, but is silent on civil enforcement,
ambiguity exists as to a scienter requirement for civil enforcement. This
ambiguity leads to part two of the Chevron test, to determine if the SEC
interpretation is reasonable.253
F. Rule 13b2-2 Deference Analysis Under Chevron: The Reasonableness
Element
Interpretations made by the SEC regarding the Rule are reasonable,
and therefore entitled to deference as long as they are not (1) arbitrary and
capricious, or (2) contrary to the language of the statute.254
248

Id. The language of the statute is as follows:

(a) Rules to prohibit
It shall be unlawful, in contravention of such rules or regulations as the Commission shall
prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, for
any officer or director of an issuer, or any other person acting under the direction thereof, to take
any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead any independent public or
certified accountant engaged in the performance of an audit of the financial statements of that
issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements materially misleading.
249
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McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 789 (2006) (citing Promotion of the Reliability of
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and Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 34,15570, 16 SEC Docket 1143, 1151 (February 15,1979));
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audit or examination of the issuer’s financial statements or the preparation of any document or report to
be filed with the Commission, directly or indirectly shall (a) make or cause to be made a materially false
or misleading statement to an accountant or (b) omit to state, or cause another person to omit to state,
any material fact necessary to make statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading to an accountant).
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1. Arbitrary and Capricious (Rational Basis)
The arbitrary and capricious test, established by the Supreme Court in
the early 1940’s and also known as the “rational basis” test, was codified in
1946 in the APA, providing a basis for judicial review of agency actions.255
The test consists of two factors.256 First, the rule will be analyzed to
determine if it furthers a legitimate statutory governmental purpose, as
opposed to a general governmental purpose.257 Second, the court must
decide if the rule is rationally related to that purpose.258
i. Legitimate Statutory Government Purpose
Rule 13b2-2 satisfies the first part of the arbitrary and capricious test
because it furthers a legitimate statutory governmental purpose. The
Congressional intent was to protect investors from directors and officers
who provide information to auditors that may produce misleading results.259
The resulting Rule created by the SEC clarifies and expands on the original
Rule 13B-2 by specifically prohibiting officers and directors from
“improperly influencing” auditors.260 The new Rule also applies these rules
to audits of investment company financial statements.261
Congress intended for courts, when applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard, to consider the agency purpose and means for
regulating behavior on a rational basis standard of review.262
ii. Rational Relation to the Legitimate Purpose
The SEC interpretation of the enabling statute need not be the only
possible interpretation of the statute, or the interpretation that the court
would have chosen.263 The SEC rule simply must be a permissible
interpretation of the statutory language.264 Agency rules should not be
disturbed when the rule addresses conflicting policy concerns between the
agency, other organizations or the public, and is within the bounds of the

255
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enabling statute.265
Conflicting policy concerns were indeed considered when Rule 13b2-2
was adopted in 2003.266 The SEC noted that during the notice and comment
period, comments from banking institutions and auditing firms expressed a
concern that a negligence standard would cause a “chilling effect” on
communications between officers and directors, and between auditors.267
The SEC claimed these concerns were based on an incorrect assumption;
that the SEC has not historically enforced the negligent communication of
misleading information in the past.268 Instead, for many years the SEC has
brought enforcement actions of that very type based on the “known or
should have known” standard.269
A court deciding if a rule is rationally related to the legitimate purpose
of the statute must engage in a subjective analysis, but the facts make it
hard to argue that it is not. The final rule press release discusses the
comments received during the notice and comment period, explaining
misconceptions and clarifying the purpose of the rule.270 It explains the
historical and continued use of the negligence standard, and how that relates
to the language of the enabling statute.271 It also affirmed that the
commission had no intention to hold parties accountable for “honest and
reasonable” accounting errors, as opposed to negligent or intended fraud.272
The commission also reinforces the underlying policy purpose of restoring
investor confidence in the audit process.273
2. Contrary to the Language of the Statute
While some may argue that there is no ambiguity in the underlying
statute, questioning the validity of the Rule, to argue that the Rule is
contrary to the statute would be a further stretch. The statute tasks the SEC
to create a rule to protect investors by declaring unlawful any actions that
can lead to materially misleading financial statements.274 The Rule that the
SEC adopted serves that purpose, and in no way conflicts with the letter or
265

Id. at 845 (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)).
See Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,820, 31,820 (May 28, 2003)
(to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 240), available at https://federalregister.gov/a/03-13095.
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Id. at nn.33-35.
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Id.
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Id. at n.4.
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See generally Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, Exchange Act Release No. 26,050,
80 SEC Docket 770 (May 20, 2003) (discussing comments received during the notice and comment
period).
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Id. at *4.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 303, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002).
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spirit of the enabling statute.275
To summarize the deference analysis of Rule 13b2-2, Chevron
analysis is preferred over Skidmore analysis because the Rule was created
with a notice and comment period, and is not simply an interpretive rule.
Applying Chevron, the enabling statute is ambiguous as to a scienter
requirement, meaning courts will defer to the SEC so long as their rule is
reasonable. The Rule is reasonable because it is not arbitrary or capricious,
it is rationally related to a legitimate purpose, and it is not contrary to the
underlying statute. Therefore, courts should defer to the SEC interpretation
of Sarbanes-Oxley section 303, and permit enforcement of Rule 13b2-2 as
written, using a negligence standard.
G. Supreme Court Decisions
Before Hochfelder,276 courts generally held that violations of the
Securities Acts were held to a negligence standard.277 From the inception of
the SEC in the 1940s, courts used a broad reading of the rules, and
evaluated the end result of an action to determine liability.278 Courts
decided the cases based on the facts and the SEC rule, but did not make a
thorough scienter analysis.279 Through the 1960s, courts continued to look
at the legislative intent behind the statutes and SEC rules, leaning more
towards a negligence standard than a scienter standard.280 To date,
decisions of the circuit courts and Supreme Court have been split regarding
the reasoning for, and requirement of, scienter to be proven in SEC
enforcement actions.281
1. The Capital Gains Decision: No Scienter Required
In 1963, an SEC enforcement case came before the Supreme Court to
275

See Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. at 31,820.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
277
Charles S. Telly, Proxies and the Modern Corporation: Scienter Under Sections 14a and 10b
of the Securities Exchange Act, 19 TULSA L. REV. 491, 556 (1984).
278
See generally In re Ward LaFrance Truck Corp 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (holding that mere
failure to disclose material facts to the shareholders created liability); see also Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d. Cir 1951) (holding that a broad generalized finding of fraud is actionable
under securities laws).
279
See id.
280
See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that the defendants’ assertion
that genuine fraud must be alleged and proven is not sufficient. The court stated that “any manipulative
device or contrivance” in contravention of the rules was to be read broadly, again affirming that scienter
was not an element required for liability.”).
281
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (“We hold that the scienter requirement enunciated
in Hochfelder is not applicable to government enforcement actions brought under §§ 10(b) and 21(d) of
the 1934 Act. Consistent with the pre-Hochfelder decisions of this Court, we continue to hold that
allegations and proof of negligence alone will suffice, for the reasons stated below.”).
276
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address the elements required to enforce securities rules.282 SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc. involved a company that issued research
reports via subscription.283 The company purchased shares of securities on
six separate occasions before recommending them in a research report.284
After recommending the securities, the price and volume rose, and the
company liquidated its shares to capture a gain.285 None of the trades were
disclosed to the subscribers of the analyst reports.286
The SEC requested a preliminary injunction to enforce the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940.287 The district court denied the injunction, holding
that the words “fraud” and “deceit” required a knowledge and intent on the
part of Capital Gains to injure their clients.288 The Second Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision five-to-four.289 The dissenting judges opined
that the business climate had matured from the inceptions of common law
fraud290 and deceit, and a broader interpretation must be adopted to suit the
securities industry.291
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the securities
laws required intent to cause injury, or whether a broad interpretation of the
rules should be used.292 The Court discussed the financial landscape
leading to the 1940 Act, and the need for regulation.293 The Court noted
that the Act regulated actions taken by an advisor consciously or
subconsciously that may affect the advisor’s financial interests.294 The
Court held that Congress “intended the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to
be construed like other securities legislation ‘enacted for the purpose of
avoiding frauds.’”295 The Court assumed that Congress was not ignorant to
the changes in financial landscape since the doctrine of common law fraud
was established, and held that securities legislation must be read broadly to
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See William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal
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encompass the legislative intent of the statutes.296 Accordingly, the Court
reversed the lower court decision, and remanded in favor of the SEC
injunction.297
2. The Hochfelder Decision: Scienter Required
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder was a private action brought by investors
under the Securities Act of 1934 against the auditor of a brokerage firm that
was responsible for auditing and filing the annual reports of the securities
firm.298 The plaintiffs alleged that Ernst and Ernst (“Ernst”) aided and
abetted the firm by failing to detect fraudulent actions, in violation of
section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.299
The district court rejected Ernst’s contention that fraud charges could not be
brought on negligence grounds, but dismissed the case due to inadequate
facts to support the action.300 The Circuit Court reversed, holding that Ernst
had a duty to inquire and disclose, and by breaching that duty, was liable to
the investors.301
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if a private action
can succeed absent a finding of “intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.”302 The Court looked at the legislative intent of the enabling
statute contained in the 1934 Act and subsequent SEC rulemaking.303 The
Court also looked at the language of the statute, and was unconvinced by
the suggestion of the SEC that Congressional intent and prior case law lean
towards a flexible interpretation, instead holding that the language clearly
supported the necessity to prove scienter.304 The SEC also failed to
convince the Court that Congress would explicitly require scienter when it
intended to include it as an element, using section 9(e) as an example: “any
person who willfully participates in any act or transaction . . . .”305
The Court explored legislative intent independently, holding Congress
failed to explicitly answer whether scienter would be required.306 “Neither
the intended scope of [s]ection 10(b) nor the reasons for the changes in its
operative language are revealed explicitly in the legislative history of the

296
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298
299
300
301
302
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304
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Id.
Id. at 201.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 188 (1976).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192.
See id. at 193.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
Id. at 201.
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1934 Act . . . .”307 The Court also quoted from a Senate Report entitled
Manipulative Practices, which contains the phrase “[t]he defendant may
escape liability by showing that the statement was made in good faith.”308
The Court ultimately ruled that the language of the Rule required scienter to
be proven for liability, and declined to extend liability to negligent
conduct.309
The dissent in Hochfelder read the language of the SEC rule to apply
to negligent and intentional conduct alike.310 Aside from the language of
the statute, the dissent also opined that the statutes were enacted for the
“broad, needed, and deserving benefit” of the victim investors.311
After the Hochfelder decision, district and circuit courts either cited to
Hochfelder, dismissing for lack of scienter,312 or distinguished cases to find
liability absent scienter.313 Courts generally held that the Hochfelder
holding, based on a private action, was not applicable to SEC enforcement
actions, and holdings prior to Hochfelder continued to be binding.314 The
Aaron v. SEC decision would resolve that issue in 1980.
3. The Aaron Decision: Scienter Required
Aaron v. SEC applied the decision in Hochfelder to the SEC as well as
private plaintiffs, and analyzed sections 17(a)(1), (2), and (3) to determine if
scienter is a required element to be proven.315 It is this reasoning and
analysis that are important to the present analysis of Rule 13b2-2. Aaron
was a manager at a New York broker-dealer.316 He supervised two brokers
who repeatedly disseminated false information about a company, despite
warnings from the company itself and lawyers involved with the
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Id. at 206 (citing S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 13 (1934)).
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Id. at 217.
311
Id. at 218.
312
See, e.g., SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1244 (S.D.N.Y 1976) (holding that the
Commission had not proven that the defendant acted with the requisite scienter, and therefore defendant
was not in violation of Rule 10b-5 or section 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
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See generally SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding
that a suit for potential future actions does not require a showing of state of mind); SEC v. Geotek, 426
F. Supp. 715, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1976) aff’d sub nom. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.
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an indispensible role in the sale” of unregistered securities to be immune from SEC initiated, injunctive
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See Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d at 1047 (1976).
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company.317 Aaron was aware, but failed to prevent the brokers from
misleading their clients.318 The SEC sought an injunction in district court
under Rule 10b-5 and sections 17(a)(1), (2), and (3).319
The district court granted the injunction, noting that “negligence alone
might suffice to establish a violation,” but holding that the intentional
failure to stop the dissemination of misleading statements was also
sufficient to establish scienter.320 The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that
“proof of negligence alone will suffice” for a SEC enforcement action.321
The Court pointed out that the Hochfelder court did not decide whether
scienter is required for SEC enforcement actions.322 The appellate court
cited SEC v. Coven323 and its analysis of the scienter requirement under
section 17(a), holding that the language of the statute did not require intent,
and that Congress considered a scienter requirement, but ultimately “opted
for liability without willfulness, intent to defraud, or the like.”324
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if scienter was a
required element of these SEC rules.325 This analysis can be applied to
Rule 13b2-2 as well. Without much analysis, the Court quoted the
Hochfelder decision, extending that holding to SEC enforcement cases as
well.326 The Court failed to distinguish a private cause of action from an
enforcement action, and failed to consider the common law fraud doctrine
analysis made by the Capital Gains Court.327 While acknowledging
Congressional intent to enact legislation protecting investors against fraud
with rules “to be construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes,’”328 the Court instead insisted that the
language of the statute did not permit an interpretation in line with the
intent of Congress.329
The Court then picked apart sections 17(a)(1), (2), and (3), holding
that 17(a)(1) required a showing of scienter, but 17(a)(2), and (a)(3) did not

317

Id. at 683.
Id.
319
See id. at 684.
320
Id.
321
Id. at 685.
322
Id.
323
SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978).
324
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 (1980) (citing Coven, 581 F.2d at 1027-28).
325
Id. at 686.
326
Id. at 691.
327
See id. at 695.
328
Id. at 695 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)) (quoting
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require scienter.330 In so holding, the Court pointed to the language of
17(a)(1), specifically the words “device,” “scheme,” and “artifice,” which
the Court stated “all connote knowing or intentional practices.”331 Section
17(a)(1) also shares the word “device” with Rule 10b-5, and borrowing
from the Hochfelder analysis, the Court maintained that “device” embraces
a scienter requirement.332
Analyzing 17(a)(2), the Court held that the language of the Rule did
not require scienter, instead looking at the end result, and not the intent
behind, the regulated conduct.333 The Court said the language of the Rule
prohibits “any type of material misstatement or omission . . . that has the
effect of defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or
not.”334 Similarly, the Court looked at the language contained in Rule
17(a)(3), specifically language proscribing engagement “in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit.”335 The Court, analogizing 17(a)(3) to the analysis of section
206(2) of the 1940 Act in Capital Gains, held that under 17(a)(3),
deliberate action is not required to protect investors.336
The dissenting opinion in Aaron calls for distinguishing between a
private action and a SEC enforcement action.337 Justice Blackmun stated
that the language was not as clear as the majority suggested.338 A historical
argument of legal tradition also distinguished between common law fraud at
law requiring scienter, and a suit in the court of chancery at equity, that did
not require intent.339 Finally, Blackmun briefly reviewed legislative intent,
discussing various state securities laws that led to, and provided a model for
federal law.340 These laws empowered state attorneys general to bring suit
for injunctive relief whenever fraudulent conduct was uncovered,
intentional or not.341
4. Synergy: Analysis of 13b2-2 Based on the Supreme Court Holdings
Applying the holdings in Capital Gains, Hochfelder, and Aaron,
330
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scienter should not be an element of SEC enforcement actions under Rule
13b2-2. The Supreme Court has analyzed three major factors when
evaluating the securities rules (1) the statutory language, (2) the legislative
intent, and (3) historical context.342
i. Statutory Language
The Supreme Court has held that words like “device,”343 “scheme,”344
and “artifice”345 are all words that indicate the need to prove scienter.
Neither Sarbanes-Oxley section 303(a) nor Rule 13b2-2 contains those
terms.346 Further, the language of Rule 13b2-2 looks to the end result; that
is to prevent materially false or misleading information from being
communicated to auditors.347 Neither willfulness nor intent is indicated as a
factor in determining whether the Rule has been violated.348 Like sections
17(a)(2) and (3), Rule 13b2-2 does not require deliberate conduct to carry
out the purpose of the Rule to protect investors.349
ii. Legislative Intent
The Capital Gains Court assumed that Congress, in enacting the
statute, was aware of the changing landscape of the securities industry,
holding that the securities laws must be interpreted broadly to carry out the
intent of Congress, to protect investors.350
The Hochfelder Court
discounted the SEC assertions that Congress included the words “willfully”
or “intentionally” when required, and referred to a report that indicated that
misstatements or omissions made in good faith were not actionable.351 The
Aaron Court borrowed from Hochfelder in its analysis of section 17(a)(1)
looking for legislative intent in the language of the statute.352 Absent the
shared language of Rule 10b-5, the Court looked to the end result that
Congress wanted to prevent when analyzing sections 17(a)(2) and (3).353

342
See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680
(1980); SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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Sarbanes Oxley section 303 was enacted in 2002.354 Based on the
Court’s jurisprudence in this area of the law it is fair to assume that, if
Congress was not aware of the modern financial landscape and how it
differs from the days when the doctrine of common law fraud was
developed, it is now. Congress is now on constructive notice of the need to
be explicit in the realm of securities law, having seen the cases that have
come before the various circuit courts and the Supreme Court.355 And yet,
Congress has opted not to use the words “willful” or “intentional” in the
statute.356 The language of the statute does indeed seek to regulate an end
result, and as such should be interpreted broadly to carry out its function.
5. Compare and Contrast with other SEC Rules
Omission of an explicit scienter requirement is not conclusive proof
that the SEC is not required to prove scienter when enforcing a rule.357 For
instance, Rule 13b2-2 does not contain an explicit scienter requirement.358
But the SEC has enacted other rules that do not explicitly require scienter,
yet the Supreme Court has found scienter to be a required element for
finding a violation of the Rule.359 These rules can be distinguished from
13b2-2 by analyzing the statute and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
Arguably the most commonly enforced SEC rule, Rule 10b-5 forbids
material misstatements or omissions in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities.360 While the language of the statute does not explicitly require
scienter for civil liability, the Supreme Court has held that scienter is
required to prevail on a civil 10b-5 charge.361 Specifically, the Court held
354
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ and device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
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that use of the words “manipulative and deceptive” to modify “device or
contrivance” in section 10(b) strongly suggests an element of scienter.362
Such an outcome is unsurprising, and is consistent with one of the major
components of the Aaron decision.363 Recall, in Aaron v. SEC, the Supreme
Court affirmed that the requirement to establish scienter to prevail on a 10b5 action applies when the SEC is the plaintiff as well.364 The holding also
affirmed the analysis of the language of section 10(b), pointing out that
“‘manipulative,’ ‘deceptive,’ and ‘contrivance’ clearly refer to knowing and
intentional misconduct.”365 The Court added that the legislative history
indicated an intention to include a scienter requirement.366
To establish liability for a violation under section 17(a)(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933, a plaintiff must establish scienter.367 Like any other
plaintiff, the scienter requirement applies to the SEC as well.368 In Aaron,
the Supreme Court analyzed the statutory language “to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud,” and held that the legislature clearly intended
for scienter to be an element of the offense.369 Comparing the language of
17(a)(1) to the Hochfelder ruling regarding Rule 10b-5, the Court held that
inclusion of the word “device” was indicative of a scienter requirement in
17(a)(1), just as the Hochfelder Court held it was for Rule 10b-5.370
The Supreme Court has contrasted the language in section 17(a)(1) and
Rule 10b-5 that require scienter, to the language of section 17(a)(2) and (3)
of the Securities Act of 1933 that do not.371 The language of 17(a)(2), “to
obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,

(2014), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities
based swap agreement (as defined in section 206b of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
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not misleading,” does not indicate that intent to defraud is required.372 The
making of an untrue statement does not indicate intent; merely making the
statement, with or without intent, violates the Rule.373 Contrast the making
of a statement with employing a device, scheme or artifice to defraud;
employing indicates not only mere action, but also intention to defraud.374
Taking calculated steps to defraud, versus making misleading statements
that can be made knowingly or unknowingly, is the difference between the
requirement to prove scienter or not.
Analysis of section 17(a)(3) yields similar results.375 The Aaron Court
looked at the end result, not the action leading to that result, to determine if
scienter is an element to be proven for a violation.376 Here the statute
prohibits engagement “in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”377
The Court held that deliberate dishonesty is not required, analogizing the
language of the statute with similar language in section 206(2) of the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 that also did not require “deliberate
dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors.”378
Rule 13b2-2 is worded such that the Supreme Court would likely hold
that scienter is not a required element that the SEC must prove for a court to
find a defendant civilly liable.379 The language of 13b2-2 does not involve
engaging in deceitful or scheming activity for a violation to occur.380 One
need not employ a “device” to violate 13b2-2.381 Instead, like sections
17(a)(2) and (3), 13b2-2 seems to focus on the end result; that is to prevent
the communication of misleading information or the omission of such
information to auditors, subsequently misleading investors.382
The wording of Rule 13b2-2, such as (a)(1) and (c)(1)(i) (to “make or
cause to be made a materially false or misleading statement to an
accountant,”)383 and (a)(2) and (c)(1)(ii) (“[o]mit to state, or cause another
person to omit to state . . .”) are more analogous to the wording of 17(a)(2),
which reads “to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
372
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statement . . . ,”384 and 17(a)(3), which reads “to engage in any transaction,
practice or course of business which would operate as a fraud . . . .”385
These rules are common in that they do not employ a scheme or artifice to
defraud, nor do they use a device to defraud.
6. A Scienter Requirement is a High Hurdle to Overcome
Requiring the SEC to prove scienter in a Rule 13b2-2 civil
enforcement action is akin to providing a negligence defense to defendants.
Directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to provide accurate financial
information to accountants and auditors.386 By requiring the SEC to prove
scienter when misleading information is given, defendants who, as a result
of actual negligent behavior or as a result of intentional behavior disguised
as simple negligence, become immune to SEC enforcement actions to
remedy past or prevent future fraud.
The SEC is up against a powerful force—greed. Greed is a naturally
motivating human instinct.387 A driver for positive creativity, efficiency,
and success, greed can also be dangerous if left unchecked, transforming
from a positive motivator to a negative motivator to seek gains without
regard to the consequences of others.388 This negative motivator, combined
with a scienter requirement, makes it worthwhile for one to misrepresent
information for their personal or corporate gain, knowing full well that the
ability of the SEC, as well as the private class action litigator, is limited and
unlikely to succeed.
The Private Litigation Securities Reform Act of 1995 (“PLSRA”) was
designed to prevent abuses by class action private plaintiffs by requiring,
among other things, increased specificity of the misleading information
alleged, “pleading with particularity the facts giving rise to a strong
inference of scienter,” and a halt to discovery until the first two elements
are met.389 These requirements act as a hurdle to be jumped before their
action can move forward.390 Congress cited two primary purposes for
enacting the PSLRA; to reduce abusive litigation, and to reduce coercive
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settlements.391 These purposes do not translate to the SEC, having no stake
in the outcome except that of fulfilling their mission, which is to protect
investors. In sum, a negligence standard would hold directors and officers
to the professional standard required of their position, and allow the SEC to
carry out their work of protecting the markets and the investing public.
7. The SEC Has Limited Resources to Carry Out Its Mission
The SEC, unlike other government agencies, is not self-funded; the
agency does not receive the fines it imposes, it receives a budget annually
from Congress.392 Currently the SEC employs 4,200 employees, who
monitor “more than 25,000 market participants, including broker-dealers,
investment advisers, mutual funds and exchange traded funds, municipal
advisors, clearing agents, transfer agents, and 18 exchanges.”393 In fact, the
SEC budget has been cut recently, despite revenue produced from fines and
penalties roughly doubling the prior year budget, and a twenty five percent
budget increase proposed by the SEC Chair.394 Decreased budgets and
limited staffing, combined with new laws, are increasing the SEC workload,
further limiting it from carrying out its mission.
The Commission’s ability to properly enforce the rules and protect the
investing public is limited.395 Many incidents are not prosecuted due to
limited SEC resources.396 Requiring the Commission to prove scienter for a
Rule 13b2-2 contributes to the strain of an already underfunded agency, and
is contrary to the congressional intent both in creating the Commission, but
also more importantly is contrary to the purpose of enacting section 303 of
Sarbanes-Oxley.
8. Directors and Officers Can Be Protected for Good Faith
Misstatements
Corporations can purchase insurance to protect directors and officers
of the company from personal liability.397 Known as “D&O Insurance,”
these policies can cover the cost of litigation, and financial liability for
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losses, and even civil penalties if they are covered by the policy.398 More
importantly, while these policies protect against accusations of breach of
fiduciary duty, they generally do not cover intentional fraud or violations of
“statutes, rules, and regulations.”399 From a policy perspective, this is
important; while the SEC has stated that good faith misstatements and
omissions are not actionable, any claims brought would be covered by the
policy for the cost of defense from the time the suit is initiated, unless the
fraud provision applies.400 The fraud provision of the policy incentivizes
directors and officers to avoid intentionally disseminating fraudulent
information or violating securities rules and laws by denying coverage if
fraud is determined by a final adjudication.401
V. CONCLUSION
In the early 1940’s, the president of a company in Boston was telling
his shareholders that his company, which had quadrupled its earnings, was
doing poorly, so that he could purchase the stock from them at deflated
prices.402 The SEC drafted a rule to forbid this type of fraudulent activity,
which became Rule 10b-5, which was passed without comment or debate,
save for one commissioner, Sumner Pike, who quipped, “Well, we are
against fraud, aren’t we?”403 The question of whether the SEC should be
required to prove scienter to enforce Rule 13b2-2 can be answered with that
same rhetorical question.
Unfortunately, it is not that simple. But, fortunately, legal analysis and
discussion of policy issues brings us to the same result. A look at the
enabling statute shows that the language of Sarbanes-Oxley section 303(a)
shows no intent to include a scienter requirement. The Rule, as written,
does not require the SEC to prove scienter. The SEC is entitled to
deference from the courts in their interpretation of any ambiguity in the
Rule. The SEC interprets the Rule to not require scienter.
Case law analyzing SEC rules leads us to the same conclusion by
comparing and contrasting cases. The Supreme Court’s favorable decision
in Capital Gains held that securities laws should be read broadly, enabling
the SEC to prevent fraud. The Hochfelder Court required scienter, but can
be distinguished because it was ruling on a private action. Aaron applied
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the analysis in Hochfelder, requiring scienter for SEC enforcement actions
of section 17(a), and binding later courts to the decision, or forcing them to
distinguish from Aaron.
Most importantly though are the analyses the Court used to arrive at
these holdings, and the application of those analyses to Rule 13b2-2 to
predict how the Court would rule. The broad interpretation in Capital
Gains, the private enforcement specified in Hochfelder, and the similarity
of Rule 13b2-2 to the analysis of sections 17(a)(2) and (3) in Aaron, all lead
to the conclusion that, if the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari to
decide whether the SEC is required to prove the element of scienter in an
enforcement action, it would rule in the negative.
From a policy perspective, to require the SEC to prove scienter in a
Rule 13b2-2 enforcement action is counter-intuitive. The SEC was created
to enact and enforce rules to instill confidence in the financial markets and
to protect investors. There is no pecuniary gain for the SEC in an
enforcement action. Any action taken by the Commission is in the best
interest of investors and the financial markets. To “tie its hands” by
requiring it to prove the element of scienter in a 13b2-2 action is tantamount
to providing a defense for any director or officer who misleads an auditor,
except for the most egregious circumstances. A negligence standard holds
directors and officers to a standard that the investing public expects and
deserves.

